totally against the grain of Irish public opinion by suggesting that the needs of the body could sometimes be placed before the needs of the spirit.  

During 1916–17, Fred Allan, Joseph McGrath and others raised funds for the families of executed 1916 rebels, most of which was then handed over to Kathleen Clarke (Tom's widow). Mrs Clarke then chose Michael Collins to be the new IRB secretary, Harry Boland to be the new treasurer, and Seán McGarry (ex-manager of The Republic and formerly a close friend of Tom Clarke) as president.  

Thereafter, these men, most notably Collins, attempted to turn the IRB into a directing revolutionary committee within both the Irish Volunteers and Sinn Féin, to ensure that both organisations would take up the IRB's republican ideals. Only two of the commanders of the haphazard 1916 forces were not executed, namely Countess Markievicz and Éamon de Valera, both of whom were made icons of the Rising as soon as public opinion began to be swayed in its favour by the Catholic press. As is well known, the latter went on to become the new leader of Sinn Féin. Like Parnell, de Valera proved able to appeal to both revolutionary and conservative constituencies, while the Sinn Féin party of 1917–22, like the Irish party of 1880–5, was a conglomerate of nationalist revolutionary and conservative political elements. In the revolution that followed, however, one must be cautious not to overemphasise the importance of the IRB owing to the small size of its membership. Furthermore, recent studies have convincingly suggested that this 'revolution' for so many volunteers was simply an opportunity to revive the land war of the 1880s, and had little or nothing to do with ideological considerations. In turn, debate on the revolution has become more realistic and begun to resemble some of the historical debates on the republican upheavals that took place in France between 1789 and 1871, and the motives of the various volunteer forces that took part in those struggles.  

To some extent one could say that true different risings took place in Dublin at Easter 1916. First, there was a republican rising, to vindicate the 'Fenian dead' of the nineteenth century, launch an independence struggle in Ireland, and revive the IRB. Second, there was an 'Irish-Ireland' rising, designed to champion the cultural separatism of the Irish-Ireland movement and, more specifically, the anti-First World War stance adopted by the Irish Volunteers. The 1916 Rising would not have happened were it not for Tom Clarke's IRB circle. However, it was the Irish-Ireland separatist idea, which was already well-established by 1914, that the Rising was destined to symbolise in the mind of the general Irish public. This was the dual heritage of the 1916 Rising.

When Pádraig H. Pearse walked out from the General Post Office in Dublin on Easter Monday 1916 to read the Proclamation of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic it was, according to the poet and novelist James Stephens, that 'many Irish-Americans with German officers had arrived also with full military equipment'. The recognition of this connection between America and Ireland should have come as no surprise. Historical circumstances had brought them together over the past centuries. America had been the refuge, the haven, to which the Irish could flee hunger and distress, social and religious discrimination, and political and economic constraints. The result was a huge population in the United States with Irish roots and many with a bitterness toward the British regime and a determination to assist any Irish movement to achieve independence. All of this gave Ireland and the United States a very interwoven history. While the actual Rising may have been a total surprise to the spectators along O'Connell Street that April evening, it should be no surprise that there was an American dimension to these monumental events.

For over 200 years North America had been the destination for Irish people struggling with economic, social, religious, and political disabilities at home. Extensive migration from Ulster in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries meant that a high proportion of people with Irish connections in colonial America and in the early republic. The figures vary greatly, but it is estimated that by 1790 there were over 300,000 people in the United States of Irish descent, and the two decades prior to the war of 1812, including refugees from the troubled rebellions of 1798 and 1803, may have accounted for another 100,000. 'Emigration is the great fact of Irish social history from the early nineteenth century,' Roy Foster has observed, and this was borne out following the War of 1812 when even larger numbers began to move from Ireland to the United States.  

Francis M. Carroll
Perhaps as many as 1,000,000 emigrated between 1815 and 1845, and at least 3,000,000 in the Famine years between 1845 and 1870. David Fitzpatrick has pointed out that in 1890 some 39 per cent of those born in Ireland were living abroad, the largest portion of them in the United States. By the early twentieth century there were almost 5,000,000 people in the United States either born in Ireland or with Irish parents. By taking third and fourth generation Irish-Americans into account, there may have been as many as 20,000,000 or about 21 per cent of the population. As the Great War broke out in 1914 the United States had, therefore, an enormous population that had some kind of Irish connection. If even a fraction of their number supported an Irish cause a vast amount of money could be raised and great pressure could be brought to bear in the United States or in Ireland. The Irish-American community was a tool of great potential in the hands of any Irish political movement.

Linkage between Irish nationalist activity and the Irish-American community can be traced to Wolfe Tone's sojourn in the United States in 1795 and to the organising of the Friends of Ireland Society in 1840 in support of Daniel O'Connell's Repeal movement. The most serious of these connections was the creation in 1858 by James Stephens of the Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) in 1858, to some extent at the prompting and with the financial support of John O'Mahony and Michael Doheny in New York. These men and many of their early followers had been part of the unsuccessful Young Ireland rebellion of 1848. The IRB, and its counterpart in the United States, jointly became known as the Fenian movement. During the course of the early 1860s they both grew into formidable organisations. The IRB may have had as many as 40,000 members, some of whom had been, or still were, soldiers in the British army, while in the United States the 100,000 to 175,000 men of Irish descent who served in the union army in the Civil War, some 50,000, now with military training, joined the Fenian Brotherhood. Despite these large and, in the American instance, well-financed organisations, personal rivalries between the leaders, divided counsel, and a certain amount of bad luck resulted in neither the Irish nor the American Fenians actually carrying out successful military operations. The British suppression of the Fenian uprising in 1867 led to the arrest and imprisonment of many of the leading figures and the reversion of the organisation to a steadily diminishing secret society. In the United States the fiasco of the several attempted invasions of Canada and the divisions within the leadership led to Clan na Gael superseding the Fenians in the late 1860s. Unlike the American Fenians, the Clan was a secret society, led largely by former Fenians. However, within twenty years the Clan was also racked by a bitter split and murder scandal that lasted until 1900, considerably reducing its effectiveness.

While the physical force movement was struggling to re organise itself in the 1870s and 1880s the Irish party came gradually under the control of Charles Stewart Parnell. The leadership that Parnell brought to the party at Westminster seemed to promise the implementation of home rule in Ireland through constitutional politics, and Irish-Americans rallied behind Parnell and the prospect of self-government in the form of the American Land League and the American National League. Parnell and various of his lieutenants, including his sister Fanny, travelled to the United States to rouse support for home rule and to raise funds for the party. However, Parnell's downfall in 1890, his death in 1891, and the failure of the home rule bill in 1893, led to a split in the Irish party and the collapse of the home rule movement. Not until 1900 were the differences patched up and the party reunited under John Redmond. While the more sympathetic Liberals in England were able to form a new government at Westminster in late 1905, it was not until the two general elections in 1910, the second of which (in December) left the Liberals and Conservatives with 272 seats each, that home rule again became a serious political prospect, with the Irish party holding the balance of power with 84 seats.

Supported by the United Irish League of America, Redmond and leading members of his party, such as John Dillon and T.P. O'Connor, visited the United States repeatedly, raising thousands of dollars (perhaps as much as $100,000 in 1910 alone, leading to Redmond being labelled the 'dollar dictator' by his opponents) with which to fight elections and subsidise members of parliament. As the prospects for home rule rose, so did enthusiasm in America.

It is difficult to imagine today the degree of support that existed for home rule across the United States. In 1910 President William Howard Taft, and several other American dignitaries, travelled by train to Chicago to attend the St Patrick's day dinner organised by the Irish Fellowship Club, as a gesture of support for home rule. Former President Theodore Roosevelt was the guest of Redmond, T.P. O'Connor, and others in the House of Commons dining room at a reception and lunch in June 1910. Judge Martin J. Keogh from New York wrote to Redmond in November of 1910 to assure him that: 'I have never felt more keenly interested in your work nor have I ever had more genuine admiration for the way you are
conducting it than I have at the present time." When the home rule bill was introduced in April of 1912 some fifteen Irish-American community leaders sent a cable congratulating Redmond on this achievement. As the home rule legislation worked its way through parliament, congratulations and praise poured in to Redmond. You have achieved more than I believed it possible to be done in the lifetime of an Irish Leader in our day, and more than all, you have the race at home and abroad solidly, sincerely, and almost unanimously with you," Judge Keogh told Redmond when the bill passed its second reading in 1912. When the third reading of the bill was passed, Congressman Goodwin of Arkansas introduced a resolution congratulating the people of Ireland on its passage. Having been defeated in the House of Lords the home rule bill was introduced again and passed in the Commons on 9 June 1913. The following day Redmond read to the Commons a letter from Theodore Roosevelt that said that home rule 'bids fair to establish good will amongst the English-speaking people'. If the passage of the home rule bill under the new rules of the reformed House of Lords seemed to imply the inevitable implementation of the measure, the emergence of militant unionism, particularly in Ulster, supported by the Conservative party in Britain, threatened otherwise and began to change the whole political picture.

Clan na Gael was reunited in 1900 under the leadership of John Devoy. Devoy was described as 'the greatest of the Fenians' by Padraig Pearse, an admirer, and as 'a sleepless demon' by Patrick Egan, a critic. Although in his seventies, Devoy was the pivotal figure in the physical force movement before 1916. A former member of the French Foreign Legion, a Fenian recruiter, a supporter of Parnell, and a newspaper reporter and editor, Devoy devoted his whole life to Ireland. However, overshadowed by the likely success of home rule and unsuccessful in mounting any recent physical force operations, the Clan and the IRB faced serious difficulties in the early years of the century. By 1910 membership of the IRB in Ireland and Britain was down to between 1,500 and 2,000 from its high point of about 40,000 members. To make matters worse, these members were largely elderly men who saw the IRB as something of a social club rather than a revolutionary organisation. 'Nearly ten years [John] D[evoy] of struggle and we are reaching what seems to be the end,' wrote John T. Keating, a Chicago member of the Clan's revolutionary directory, and he acquiesced in Devoy's conclusion that 'another period of mere negative policy ... will kill us if too much prolonged'.

But what to do? Resistance to the Boer War had been ineffectual, oppo-


twentieth century these groups were largely overshadowed by the Irish party and the mainstream of Dublin culture. To the degree to which they represented an alternative they had the support of Clan members in the United States. The list of these counter-culture people from Ireland who toured the United States is impressive, and included Douglas Hyde, William Butler Yeats, Lady Gregory, Maud Gonne, John MacBride, Francis Sheehy Skeffington, Thomas Ashe, Bulmer Hobson, Pearse, and Roger Casement amongst others. Most of these people corresponded with Devoy at some time, and many had their arrangements facilitated by Joseph McGarrity, Judge Cohalan or Cohalan’s friend, the Standard Oil lawyer and patron of the arts, John Quinn. In fact, Devoy grumbled to Cohalan that, ‘The time of our men is constantly taken up with raising money for the [Gaeltic] League, to the neglect of our own work,’ but the complaint could also be made about other Irish-Ireland organisations.17

Although support and enthusiasm for home rule would continue for several years more, the beginnings of serious unionist resistance, and ultimately the outbreak of the Great War, fundamentally changed the Irish situation in America as well as at home. The defiance of the unionists had two immediate results. The first was the formation of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), which inspired the subsequent creation of the Irish Volunteers. The second was the opening of talks about the exclusion of Ulster from a self-governing southern Ireland, which provoked violent anger from extreme nationalists and growing dissatisfaction among the home rulers in America.

The signing of the Ulster Covenant in 1912, together with the assurance of support from Andrew Bonar Law, the leader of the Tories, signalled the refusal of unionists to accept home rule for Ireland, then working its way through parliament. More dramatic defiance came in January 1913, when the unionist leader, Sir Edward Carson, organised the UVF. While many questioned the seriousness of this threat, the rhetoric of defiance, if not rebellion, remained very strong. The illegal importation of German guns into the port of Larne in April of 1914, together with the apparent refusal of elements of the British army in the Curragh camp a month earlier to obey any possible orders to undertake operations in Ulster, demonstrated that the British government was prepared to countenance private armies within the realm. At the instigation of Professor Eoin MacNeill, of University College Dublin, the idea was mooted, and a meeting was held in the Dublin Rotunda on 23 November 1914, to organise the Irish Volunteers. Although MacNeill became the commander in chief of the

Volunteers, members of the IRB held dominant positions in the organisation. Even so, the Clan was unsure how to react. Devoy’s Gaelic American came out in favour of the Volunteers on 3 January 1914, but by spring, while the Volunteers were organising throughout the country, there had still been no much material response from America. The O’Rahilly wrote to Devoy from Dublin on 6 April and lamented: ‘If the sincere Irish in America will not help us in this situation they will have neglected the greatest opportunity in a century.’18 By May Clan leaders were urging Devoy that the Volunteers should be supported, and a disgruntled member from Philadelphia wrote to Devoy’s assistant, James Reidy, reporting that the Clan members at a recent meeting agreed that, in view of the inaction thus far, the Irish-American Club should be sold and the proceeds sent to the men who are willing to do something that will redound to the credit of Irish nationalists throughout the universe’.19 In early June the Clan sent out a circular to camps across the United States reporting that a meeting of Clan leaders in New York had endorsed the Irish Volunteers and created the Irish National Volunteer Fund committee, headed by Joseph McGarrity, Denis A. Spellessy, and Patrick J. Griffin, ‘to aid the people of Ireland to organise, arm, and equip a permanent National Army of Defence for the protection of their rights and liberties and to maintain the Territorial Integrity of Ireland’.20 They urged that Clan members give their support, and by mid-June McGarrity was able to send £1,000 to MacNeill to buy weapons and thousands more were promised.

This support from the Clan was almost immediately threatened by John Redmond’s claim, as the elected leader of the Irish people, to control a majority of the representatives on the governing body of the Volunteers. Redmond and his followers were so hated and distrusted by the people in the Clan and the IRB that the matter of support for the Volunteers was seriously questioned (and the integrity of those IRB members of the board who had acquiesced seriously challenged). The physical force movements in both Ireland and the United States were in danger of splitting over this issue. Devoy and McGarrity consulted throughout June as to what to do. Judge O’Neill Ryan, a Clan member from St Louis, Missouri, summed up the dilemma:

I do not know where we are at on this Volunteer question. If the reports in the Gaelic American of last week are correct … we have lost control of the situation in Ireland, and it has passed into the hands of Redmond, et al., which would mean that money raised here would be under their control. In other words,
we will be co-operating with the UIL [United Irish League] in this country to raise funds for an organisation which they will control and emasculate. 21

It seemed to be an irresolvable problem. Devoy was in touch with Tom Clarke in Dublin and concluded that Hobson had been the key to the surrender to Redmond. McKearthy heard from MacNeill who made a strong appeal for support from America. He thanked McKearthy for the money that had been sent and said that, more than money, what were needed were arms and ammunition, that the British government's proclamation forbidding the importation of arms was illegal, and that the unionists in Ulster and Britain had forced Irishmen to take precautions to defend their rights. He concluded with a strong appeal to friends of Ireland in the United States:

It is surely plain to the minds of every friend of Ireland and of Liberty that a unique and supreme call has gone forth, and that the one great opportunity of an age has arisen for the service of a sacred cause. We in Ireland do not hesitate to ask you our kindred in a land where freedom was won in no small measure by Irish valor and Irish devotion to liberty and by the outpouring of Irish life-blood—rather we entreat and beseech you to join with us, making the grand effort of our lives and shrinking from no sacrifice that the peril and the hope of so great a crisis may depend. 22

It was an appeal that was hard to resist, despite the mistrust and sense of betrayal. In these circumstances it was fortuitous that Sir Roger Casement, the distinguished humanitarian and retired member of the British consular service, arrived in the United States to represent the Provisional Committee to raise funds for the Irish Volunteers. Casement had sailed on the Cassandra to Montreal and was in New York by 18 July. Started by the animosity toward Hobson and those members of the Provisional Committee who had voted to accept the Redmond members, Casement worked hard to convince Devoy, McGarrity, and other Clan leaders that, given Redmond's prestige and political domination in Ireland, there had been no alternative but to accept the participation of his nominees on the Provisional Committee—no choice, short of a destructive public fight. Casement assured Devoy and the Clan leadership that the loyal and reliable IRB members of the Provisional Committee would still hold the key positions and that when guns were obtained they would be placed in the hands of reliable elements. As it is we have kept the Volunteer body intact— and if we can get guns into the hands of, say, a dozen chosen corps it will revolutionise the mind of the whole country’ he told Devoy. 23 Although wary, Devoy was convinced of Casement's sincerity and good intentions. Whatever lingering misgivings the Clan leaders had about the intervention of Redmond and his followers into the Volunteer organisation, in the end they continued to support it. Casement travelled along the eastern seaboard and as far west as Chicago, meeting Irish leaders and speaking to Irish groups, even meeting Theodore Roosevelt. He was a particularly effective publicist for the Volunteers. Devoy recorded that $50,000 was raised specifically for the Volunteers by the Clan and that roughly another $50,000 was sent to the IRB in the years before the 1916 Rising. 24

Many of the anxieties that people had about the Volunteers were overshadowed by the momentous events that occurred at the end of July and early August of 1914. First of all, 1,500 rifles and ammunition that had been purchased in Germany were run into Howth harbour by Erskine Childers on 26 July and Killeen in Co. Wicklow, by Conor O'Brien several days later. These were organised by Casement's circle of friends in Dublin and London, although the £1,000 sent in June helped to finance the purchase. The gun-running had an electrifying effect among the Irish in the United States, and as Bulmer Hobson wrote in his history of the Volunteers, the organisation never again lacked funds. Casement quoted Devoy as saying that the gun-running was 'the greatest deed done in Ireland in 100 years'. 25 Secondly, the attempt by the police and British army troops to seize the weapons as the Volunteers marched back into Dublin and the subsequent shooting by the soldiers at jeering crowds on Bachelor's Walk in Dublin seemed to many to signal the beginning of hostilities in Ireland over home rule and Ulster's separation. Even the New York Times came to this conclusion and ran the headline: 'British troops shed her blood in Ulster war'. 26 Finally, these dramatic events were themselves overshadowed by the outbreak of the Great War on 3 and 4 August 1914. The war, of course, created a whole new set of circumstances.

Quite apart from the matter of Redmond's control of the Irish Volunteers, which preoccupied the leaders of Clan na Gael in the United States, was the growing discussion about Ulster's exclusion from home rule for an undefined period of time. These talks, and Redmond's agreement, caused growing alarm among the supporters of the Irish party in the United States. While many non-Irish-Americans saw nothing untoward in this proposition, it was anathema to the Irish-American community. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge wrote to a friend that he had always supported home
rule for Ireland, but he saw nothing wrong with home rule for Ulster, using as an example the determination of Maine to separate from Massachusetts in the early nineteenth century. If you are going to have home rule and local self-government it must be applied fairly to all,' he concluded. But W. Bourke Cockran, a congressman from New York and a moderate nationalist and long-time supporter of the Irish party, wrote in March of 1914, following a protest meeting at Carnegie Hall, that Irishmen here have been shocked beyond expression to learn that partition of the Island has become no more a proposal that might be considered, but a proposal that has been actually accepted. In a statement that was incredibly prescient Cockran concluded that if a revolt [against Redmond] were started in Ireland, I think the Irish in America would support it to the man.28

The signing of the home rule bill into law by the king on 18 September, with the provision that implementation be suspended until the end of the war, met with a mixed response in the United States. Many now accepted home rule as an accomplished fact, but not all. Redmond's public statement just two days later, at Woodenbridge, Co. Wicklow, urging the Volunteers to join the British army, together with his speech in support of Britain in the war on 3 August, had the powerful effect of alienating large numbers of the Irish in America who had not aligned themselves with the Clan. In Ireland his appeal led to the separation of the original Irish Volunteers from Redmond's National Volunteers. In the United States, the leading home rule newspaper, the Irish World, came out in opposition to him, and Michael J. Ryan, president of the United Irish League of America (who had a German-American wife) was also opposed.29 With the national leadership divided, the activities of the UIL were virtually suspended, and even the maintenance of a national office was in doubt. Redmond sent Alderman Daniel Boyle MP on a tour of the United States in 1915, but without much success. Early in the following year Boyle made another trip to raise money for a new publication, a monthly called Ireland, to be edited by J.C. Walsh and Shane Leslie. But even with lead articles by distinguished figures such as Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore, the publication failed to find a readership or rally much support.30

The passage and suspension of home rule for a divided Ireland, the urging of enlistment in British forces, the split in the Volunteer movement, and the reality of a major war between Britain and Germany placed in doubt the continued loyalty of many Irish-Americans to Redmond. The outbreak of the Great War profoundly changed the direction of events for the Clan leadership in the United States and for Sir Roger Casement as well. When war was declared, Casement told Joseph McGarity: 'Perhaps Ireland's chance has come.' Irish-Americans had worked together with German-Americans in years past to obstruct efforts to improve Anglo-American relations, so it was to be expected that as soon as war broke out they would again show solidarity. In large public meetings in New York, Newark, Atlantic City, Philadelphia, Washington DC, Chicago and St Louis, Britain's role in the war was condemned and John Redmond criticised for encouraging Irish involvement. As early as 9 August as many as 10,000 Irish-Americans gathered at Celtic Park in New York to denounce Redmond and home rule and to cheer the Kaiser. Prominent Irish leaders, such as John Devoy, Jeremiah A. O'Leary, and Sheamus O'Sheel, were conspicuous at these events and at German-American rallies as well.32

Devoy also arranged for a meeting between Casement and Georg von Skal, a journalist who worked as a propagandist for the German embassy. The same day the German military attaché, Franz von Papen, reported to the Foreign Office on the Celtic Park rally, saying that he had met Casement, from whom he learned that the Irish were 'ready to free themselves' if supported by Germany and supplied with arms for 50,000.33 Casement drafted a long letter for the Irish-American community to the Kaiser on 25 August in which he outlined Irish-American support for Germany in the war, pointing out that while Britain held Ireland, Britain was able to maintain mastery of the seas, and petitioned that when Germany won the war the Kaiser would 'impose a lasting peace upon the seas by effecting the independence of Ireland and securing its recognition'. This was signed by the Clan executive, Devoy's name first, and sent to Germany through the embassy. There appear to have been several meetings with Ambassador Count Johann Heinrich von Bernsdorff, Captain von Papen, assistant ambassador Wolf von Igeli, von Skal, and other members of the embassy. On the basis of these contacts von Bernsdorff advised the Foreign Office on 27 September that if the war were expected to be a prolonged one, he recommended Germany's 'falling in with Irish wishes, provided that there are really Irishmen who are prepared to help'.34 On 10 October Devoy, McGarity, Judge Cohalan and Casement met with Ambassador von Bernsdorff, Captain von Papen, and Dr Bernhard Dernburg for an hour and a half at the German Club in New York. The ambassador was told that the war presented an opportunity for Ireland 'to overthrow English rule in Ireland and set up an independent government', that both weapons and officers were needed, but not money. Von Bernsdorff reported to the
British government before the European war came to an end. Although there were some objections, MacDermott and Tom Clarke were delegated to pursue the matter, which they did without much further consultation with the rest of the Supreme Council. They did work with a similarly small group from within the General Council of the Irish Volunteers, thus secretly committing that organisation to a rebellion also. All of this needed money, and the Clan and the Irish-American community began sending funds to both the IRB and the Volunteers. In September and November £2,000 was sent to the IRB when Thomas Ashe and Diarmuid Lynch returned to Ireland. It was recognised that when the Irish Volunteers and the National Volunteers split in the autumn of 1914 a good portion of the money was seized by Redmond’s forces. Funds had to be sent to the Irish Volunteers right away. The Cohalan papers show that £10,000 was withdrawn from the Irving National Bank on 20 October by the treasurer of the Irish National Volunteer Fund (and also taken to Ireland by Lynch), followed by another $15,000 on 12 November (taken to Ireland by John Kenney). More monies followed and in 1915 the Clan created an ‘arms fund’ to raise new money. Much of this was couriered to Ireland by an IRB messenger, Tommy O’Connor, who worked on a White Star passenger liner making regular transatlantic crossings. The Clan also continued to subsidise Casement in Germany, although not the expenses of the Irish brigade. Funds for Casement were sent through the German embassy and by couriers, such as John Kenney, Séán T. O’Kelly, Joseph Mary Plunkett, Plunkett’s sister Philomena, and the Philadelphia lawyer, Michael Francis Doyle. Indeed, as plans for the Rising developed, quite apart from providing funds, Devoy, McGarrity, and Judge Cohalan became the main link between the IRB in Ireland and the German embassy and government.

It is fair to say that the Irish-American community was not unanimous in their support for Germany in the war. This should not be surprising; even people who did not favour the Allies and did not want the United States involved in the war found German objectives and practices to be deplorable. However, there was a significant portion of the Irish-American community who consistently saw all British actions as ruthless and selfish and regarded Germany as a possible saviour of Irish fortunes. In the aftermath of the sinking of the Lusitania, a turning point in the war, a large public meeting was held on 24 June 1915 in Madison Square Garden in New York. An enormous crowd of 75,000 people, largely Irish-Americans and German-Americans, came to hear the key speaker, William Jennings Bryan, President Wilson’s former secretary of state, who had just resigned...
over the strength of Wilson’s _Lusitania_ note to the Germans. Georg von Skal chaired the meeting and Devoy and Jeremiah O’Leary were among the speakers. O’Leary, who ran the American Truth Society and published an anti-British journal called _Ball_, became so outspoken in his criticism of Britain and the United States, as it edged closer to war in 1916 and 1917, that he was eventually tried for treason. Devoy, although he was regarded as a ‘confidential agent’ by the German embassy and his newspaper was barred from the mails when the United States entered the war, managed to avoid treason charges. James K. McGuire, the former mayor of Syracuse, New York, fully embraced an Irish-German alliance and wrote two books promoting the idea: _The King, the Kaiser and Irish freedom_ in 1915, and _What could Germany do for Ireland?_ in 1916. Years later all of these people would be accused of being in the employ of the German embassy.  

There were Irish-Americans employed by the German embassy, largely to sabotage the sale and shipment of munitions to the Allies in the war. Captains von Papen, von Igol, and Karl Boy-Ed hired Irish-American dock workers on both coasts to go on strike in order to slow down and disrupt the shipments, and to place incendiary devices on munitions ships to disable or sink them at sea. To expand this programme Captain Franz Rentelen von Kleist, of German naval intelligence, was sent to the United States in 1915, rather separate from the embassy. Because of his prestige and his good relationship with Devoy and other Clan leaders, James Larkin was actively recruited to serve as an intermediary between the Germans and the workers. Larkin had numerous meetings with the Germans, to the extent of being shown explosive facilities in Hoboken, New Jersey, and seems to have taken their money from time to time, but refused to become an active participant in their sabotage. These activities linked the Irish and the Germans in the public mind in the United States and also served to demonstrate to the Germans the reliable anti-British sentiment of the Irish. These activities also came to the attention of the American government. On 18 April 1916, in an effort to stop the sabotage in the munitions industry, secret service agents raided the offices of Captain von Igol in New York. When the files and paper in the office were seized, much of the correspondence between Devoy and Judge Cohalan and the German embassy fell into the hands of the American government. There was immediate alarm that information about the Rising and its date would become public knowledge, or at least be conveyed to the British. Devoy, however, sent a reassuring note to McGarrity in a thinly disguised code:

I know you will be anxious after hearing of the fire in the house to learn if we all came off safe. I am glad to be able to inform you that all the papers relating to the property were saved except one little scrap, and that will not be much of a loss. The sale will come off on time and everything looks all right. We were very anxious for the whole day, but when the firemen got through with their work of salvage we found we had no cause for worry.

Nine days later, and six days after the Rising, the British asked the State Department for any relevant information but were turned down by Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Devoy, who despised the Wilson administration, publicly maintained that the Rising had been betrayed by the United States government. In fact, British intelligence had by this time broken the German code and was reading German transatlantic messages and had most of the material the American government had seized.

As the war unfolded there was a growing feeling among the Clan leaders that something had to be done to shape public opinion within the Irish-American community. By the autumn of 1915 Devoy became the centre of a discussion about the need for a national meeting to create a platform for opponents of Redmond and the current home rule measures. In December the idea of an Irish race convention was settled and on 15 January 1916 invitations were sent to Clan members; on 9 February the call went out to the Irish-American community for a meeting in New York on 4 and 5 March. The invitations were sent to Irish-American organisations all over the United States to send delegates. Well over 2,000 people attended, making it the largest Irish-American meeting ever held, and it was a perfect venue for strong speeches in favour of Irish self-government. The most important accomplishment of the Race Convention was the creation of a new public organisation, the Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF). The president was Victor Herbert, famous composer and grandson of Samuel Lover; the treasurer was Thomas Hughes Kelly; and the secretary was John D. Moore – all blue ribbon figures, although the Executive Committee was dominated by Clan members. One of the first acts of the Friends was to create a bureau in Stockholm, Sweden, staffed by the former US diplomat, T. St John Gaffney, who was to serve as a link to Germany. The FOIF drew thousands of people across the United States, particularly from the moribund UIL, and specific provisions were made for associate membership for existing local Irish-American societies. Of course no mention was made of the coming Rising in Ireland, although in retrospect it is clear that the organisation was intending to provide Ameri-
can support for the Rising and the subsequent Irish struggle. Indeed, the FOIF became the most important Irish-American nationalist organisation in the country over the next five years.

Although the plans for the Rising were worked out in 1915 and early 1916, under the leadership of Tom Clarke, the number of people involved remained a handful of the IRB and Volunteer leadership. The Americans had facilitated the movement of messengers in and out of Germany, but John Devoy was not informed of the actual Rising until 5 February 1916. He recounted receiving a coded message through Tommy O'Connor from the Supreme Council of the IRB. O'Connor began to decipher the message, but when the first sentence read 'Nobody but the Revolutionary Directory and the Chief German representative must know the contents of this,' Devoy took the message home and decoded the rest of it himself. The key passage informed him that the Rising would take place on Easter Sunday, 23 April 1916 and that the Germans were to 'send a shipload of arms to Limerick quay' between 20 and 23 April. Devoy immediately took these instructions to Captain von Papen, and the Germans provided a ship, the Lithu, sailing by the name Aud, a similar Norwegian vessel. The ship was loaded with captured Russian rifles and ammunition, and the key element for an effective military effort in the Rising was set in motion. On 14 April, another courier, Philomena Plunkett, the daughter of Count Plunkett, delivered a note with instructions that the weapons be delivered on Saturday 22 April. Devoy duly conveyed this change of date to von Papen and the message was sent to Germany. However, the Aud had already sailed and, without a radio, was beyond reach.

When the ship arrived off Tralee on the 20th, as arranged, there were no Volunteers to meet it — a result, perhaps, of the extreme secrecy surrounding the whole enterprise. The vessel was eventually hailed by a naval ship and escorted to Cobh (Queenstown) where its crew counted the ship. This misadventure deprived the Rising of a substantial supply of weapons and had the additional consequence of upsetting the timing by one day. In a second misadventure, Casement, by this time disillusioned with the Germans and disappointed in his effort to recruit a substantial Irish brigade from among Irish prisoners of war, was brought by submarine to Tralee Bay where he, Captain Robert Monteith and Sergeant Julian Beverley (Daniel J. Bailey) were landed on Banna Strand. Although Casement and Beverley were soon arrested, Monteith avoided detection in 1916 and eventually made his way to the United States. Casement may have hoped to cancel the Rising, but his capture, together with that of the Aud, certainly contributed to Eoin MacNeill's decision to do so. Thus when the Rising started on Easter Monday morning, on the orders of Pearse, Clarke, Connolly, and the others, the chance for surprise, for new weapons from Germany, and for a full complement of the Volunteers, had been lost.

The circumstances of the Rising in Dublin on Easter Monday 24 April 1916 are examined elsewhere in this volume. When the General Post Office was captured a coded message was sent to John Devoy in New York, 'Tom successfully operated today', which alerted him and his Clan colleagues to the fact that the insurrection had started. For the next few weeks Devoy and others had to rely on the garbled newspaper reports from Ireland and Britain. Devoy's Gaelic American printed brave stories that were largely conjecture. The reaction across the United States, among both the general public and most of the Irish-American community, was largely disapproval of the Rising as a mad escapade, probably rather cynically prompted by the Germans. However, with the executions of the signatories to the Proclamation and several others, opinion shifted to increasing criticism of the British authorities. Within the Irish-American community, the newly organised FOIF became a driving force in arranging for public meetings and passionate speakers denouncing Britain's ruthlessness and its hypocrisy in purporting to wage a war in Europe in defence of small nations. Even people outside the Irish community could see the irony in the situation. Theodore Roosevelt wrote to a friend in England:

I wish your people had not shot the leaders of the Irish rebels after they surrendered. It was a prime necessity that the rebellion should be stamped out at once, and that the men should be ruthlessly dealt with while the fighting went on; but [Sir Edward] Carson himself had just been in the cabinet; and he and the Ulstermen about two years previously had been so uncomfortably near doing the same thing, and yet had been so unconditionally pardoned, that I think it would have been the better part of wisdom not to extract the death penalty ...

The political dimension of these protests focused in the summer of 1916 on several congressional resolutions asking the British government to spare the life of Roger Casement, tried and convicted of treason in London in June. After extensive discussion the Senate passed a modified resolution seeking clemency for 'Irish political prisoners' on Saturday 29 July. The document was delivered to the White House, sent to the State Depart-
ment, and then on 2 August encoded and cabled to the embassy in London and decoded there. The result was that although the resolution was delivered to the Foreign Secretary on the morning of 3 August, Casement had been hanged earlier that day. The British government had been fully informed of this whole procedure by their ambassador in the United States, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, who told the Foreign Secretary privately: "You will of course be prepared for a great explosion of anti-British sentiment to take place in case of Casement's execution." This refusal of the British government to be moved by this appeal from the United States provided plenty of ammunition to the Clan and the FOIF in their subsequent campaigns on behalf of Irish independence.

A more practical response to the Easter Rising in the United States was the creation of the Irish Relief Fund, which raised between $100,000 and $150,000. Despite letters of introduction from the American secretary of state, when Thomas Hughes Kelly and Joseph Smith attempted to distribute the relief money in Ireland they were denied entry, although surprisingly their two more politically extreme assistants, John A. Murphy and John Gill, were allowed to enter unmolested. Murphy and Gill worked with the Irish National Aid Association and the Irish Volunteer Dependents' Fund to distribute the funds. Murphy reported that over 1,300 families had been assisted and about $25,000 a month expended. Difficulties over the Irish Relief Fund, together with the unsuccessful Senate resolution on behalf of Casement, along with other matters more specifically related to the war, contributed to the steady decline in Anglo-American relations throughout 1916.

After the United States itself entered the war in April 1917, President Wilson, in the hope of eliminating a conspicuous source of British-American animosity, asked his ambassador in London to urge the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, to make an effort to implement some form of self-government in Ireland. In response Lloyd George, who had his own experience with this intractable problem, created the Irish Convention. The chairman of the convention was Sir Horace Plunkett, a man particularly well known and respected in the United States. The Convention did ease Anglo-American relations during the war, but it failed to devise an acceptable form of Irish self-government. Wilson was also troubled by those Irish-Americans who had identified so completely with Germany in the war that they could not accept the entry of the United States on the same side as Great Britain. John Devoy, Judge Cohalan, Joseph McGarity, Jeremiah A. O'Leary, James K. McGuire, John T. Ryan, and others came under some degree of persecution by the American government for their actions.

Once the war was over, and the newly re-organised Sinn Féin party successfully replaced the Irish party in the 1918 general election, Irish-Americans returned to a very public campaign for Irish independence. Another Irish race convention was held in Philadelphia on 22 and 23 February 1919. In addition to endorsing the outcome of the 1918 election in Ireland, the convention set in motion arrangements for the meeting of a delegation with President Wilson to urge that he work for Irish independence at the Paris peace conference. The convention also created the American Commission on Irish Independence that went to Paris and Ireland to try to obtain admittance for an Irish delegation to the peace conference. Although unsuccessful, the commission did keep the Irish question before the leading figures at the peace conference and it generated a great deal of publicity for the Irish cause. The FOIF also launched the Irish Victory Fund which raised $1,000,000, which was used to finance the American Commission on Irish Independence, the early stages of the Irish bond certificate campaign, and numerous other Irish publicity activities in the United States. The Irish-American community helped to support the government of Dáil Éireann by purchasing $5,746,360 of bond certificates in a campaign launched in 1920 by Éamon de Valera during his trip to the United States. As the War for Independence ran on from 1919 to 1921, the destruction and misery caused stirred the humanitarian sympathies of Irish-Americans, who in turn contributed $5,069,194 to the American Committee for Relief in Ireland, which distributed these funds to the Irish White Cross in Ireland. The nature of the conflict also stimulated the creation of the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland, a public body that held hearings in the United States on the nature of the war in Ireland. All of these efforts kept the Irish cause before the American public while many in the Irish-American nationalist movement clashed with de Valera during his trip to the United States. This clash resulted in a split in the movement and the creation in 1920 of a pro-de Valera organisation called the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic.

Throughout all of this, from the election of the Irish party candidates in 1910 to the creation of the Irish Free State in 1921, the Irish-American community had a vital and dynamic role in the nationalist struggle in Ireland. Clan na Gaeil had helped revive the IRB, supported the Irish Volunteers, facilitated Casement's mission to Germany, provided the link
to Germany during the war, and gave assistance after the Rising. Irish-Americans gave generously to every nationalist cause. Even the American government, albeit cautiously, attempted to nudge the British forward in dealing with Ireland. When the 1916 Proclamation called on Ireland’s ‘exiled children in America’ it was not an idle gesture. The ‘exiled children’ were ready and they answered the call.

THE EASTER RISING IN THE CONTEXT OF CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MAJOR IVON PRICE

Brian P. Murphy

'Ireland is like an exam paper: all questions, no answers.' That was the observation of Arthur Clery and his dictum applies to many events in Irish history. It certainly is applicable to any telling of the story of the Easter Rising of 1916. This paper attempts to examine the events surrounding the Rising, both its causes and consequences, in the light of the censorship and propaganda that were taking place at that time.

Special reference is paid to Major Ivon Price (1866–1931), for several reasons. Firstly, he was appointed chief intelligence officer at the Irish military command at the outbreak of war in August 1914. In this capacity Price had a leading role in the application of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) of August 1914 in such areas as the press, the post and the surveillance of persons. This paper attempts to give not only some idea of the dissemination of the ‘Sinn Féin propaganda’ (especially the views of Pearse and Casement) to which Price objected in his evidence to the royal commission appointed to investigate the causes of the Rising, but also some outline of the methods that he used to counter it.

Secondly, Price’s evidence to the commission was used extensively in its final report, possibly more than any other witness, and influenced its conclusion. This paper attempts to evaluate the worth of that evidence.

Thirdly, Price’s role during the Rising and afterwards was significant, notably his attempt to bribe Eoin MacNeill to give false evidence against John Dillon and his comment on the murder of Francis Sheehy Skeffington by Captain Bowen Colthurst that ‘some of us think that it was a good thing Sheehy Skeffington was put out of the way, anyhow.’ This paper addresses these two issues and suggests some reasons why the ideals of the Easter Rising became acceptable, despite the continued efforts of Major Price and the British authorities to silence the growth of Irish republicanism.