Introduction: Doctrines, Disciplines, Discourses, Departments

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The American research university assumed its current shape around the turn of the twentieth century. It has provided a resilient model for sustaining both the division of intellectual labor within universities and a coordination of programmatic activities among them. The departmentalized organization of disciplines achieved in those years continues to govern most academic work, at least in the humanities and social sciences. Yet the array of disciplines settled on in that formative moment made sense, above all, for that moment. One hundred years earlier, disciplines like English, or sociology, or art history, or anthropology would not (or could not) have been part of the scheme. And, were the university to have taken shape one hundred years later, it seems safe to speculate that it would also have looked substantially different, no doubt registering, most simply, the developments in media technology. Cinema, radio, television, and the digital media have all come into prominence since the 1890s.

If we were to disregard Edmund Burke’s admonitions about the dangers of sweeping away the wisdom and power that inhere in institutional forms, if we were instead to take the advice of Descartes and clear the landscape of all residual formations in order to build anew, surely we would design a university system that looks rather different from the one we now inhabit.

I wish to thank Bill Brown and Robin Valenza for detailed responses to an earlier draft of this introduction. Valenza also shared with me her vast bibliography on the disciplines. I also wish to thank Alison Winter for demanding a new opening and my research assistant, Andrew Yale, for enormous help with the preparation of the manuscript. Arnold Davidson has gamely tried to save me from many errors throughout this project and should not be blamed where he may have failed.
No one really believes such a feat is possible, even if it were thought desirable. This is not to say, however, that the manner in which universities have adapted to intellectual and material change over time leaves nothing to be desired or achieved. How might the university’s shape and structure be improved if more of us thought more deliberately about such matters than we normally do? The American university’s accommodation of shifting patterns in and between the disciplines has been managed unevenly across its several domains from the natural sciences to the humanities. This unevenness is not widely recognized or registered, though many deans and provosts are undoubtedly aware of some of the differences, such as the varying rates and modes of disciplinary change and the different ways our institutions respond to them. What are the reasons for these differences and what can we learn from studying them? And what can we learn from studying disciplinary practices and configurations in other places, other times? These are questions that have not been fully explored or widely discussed—not even in the humanities and social sciences, where one might have expected that kind of self-reflection.

The essays in this special issue are part of a tentative effort to address this situation—one cannot yet hope to redress it—and it is an effort that has been gaining some momentum in recent years in many academic locations. This volume had its immediate origin in a conference of the same title held at the University of Chicago in May 2006. It also belongs to a series of projects on which Arnold Davidson and I have collaborated since the early 1990s. In all, there have been three conferences and, linked to them, three special issues of Critical Inquiry: “Questions of Evidence,” “Arts of Transmission,” and now “The Fate of Disciplines.” These projects, though not initially conceived together, have come in retrospect to attain a certain coherence and perhaps even to form a kind of academic trilogy. The first of these was planned (jointly with Harry Harootunian) to coincide with the university’s centennial celebration in 1991-92, but its generative circumstance was really the one described in Clifford Geertz’s essay on the “blurring” of the disciplinary genres in his lifetime. Geertz argued that across the disciplines the “properties” that connected the procedures aca-

deems use to analyze their objects of study had begun to merge and to form a “vast, almost continuous field” of interpretation. Following on Geertz’s telling remarks, we posed the central question, How do we make sense of changing evidentiary protocols in contemporary scholarship? How, that is, should one understand the implications of such “blurred genres” for “proof, practice, and persuasion across the disciplines”?

The topic of the changing disciplines was thus already much in play within that collection, and the quality of the scholarship ensured that the essays would become important points of departure for subsequent critical discussion. By way of a sequel, Davidson and I later joined forces with Adrian Johns to work on “Arts of Transmission,” a project occasioned by debates about scholarly communication in a period of rapidly developing information technology. This project set out to explore some broad problems about how theoretical and practical knowledge is shaped by the forms and media in which it is produced and passed on. The Baconian title should also suggest that, as with “Questions of Evidence,” “Arts of Transmission” set its horizon wide, moving beyond the immediate debate about digital scholarship to invite contributions from a variety of approaches across a range of historical periods. It included topics from Homeric oral poetry and Renaissance note-taking to classified information in the present-day U.S.

At the time of that conference the Franke Institute for the Humanities had already embarked on a multiyear initiative entitled “New Perspectives on the Disciplines: Comparative Studies in Higher Education.” By the time the “Arts of Transmission” special issue appeared, a new major conference was in the works, one more directly addressing the issues that were being developed in the series of lectures, workshops, and symposia sponsored by “The Fate of Disciplines” initiative. Those issues were all connected to a single, central recognition: the sense of a mismatch in American higher education between, on the one hand, the developing forms, practices, objects, and communities of scholarship and, on the

3. This initiative, including support for the culminating conference and for this volume, was carried out with generous funding from the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, for which we are very grateful indeed.
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other, the institutional arrangements that are supposed to advance them—that is to say, between the work we do in the humanities and social sciences and the organizational space in which we do it. This problem focused the conference that we perhaps too dramatically entitled “The Fate of Disciplines,” and it focuses the essays collected in this special issue. But, before saying more about the contexts and complexities of this central problem and about the ways in which we broke it down and reframed it to produce this set of essays, it may be helpful to offer some definitional reflections.

There are many meanings of discipline in English and in other Latin-based languages, but most of these meanings involve some notion of submission to a regularized set of practices, a sense of an imposed ordering of life and thought, body and mind. This ordering can be seen as self-imposed, but even self-discipline is often understood as the internalization of an external order. In an academic context, the term disciplines refers to an elusive subset of these more general meanings. Although discipline, in the academic sense, can be taken to mean something less like submission to rules and more like a field of study—one’s academic specialty—there remains an important distinction to be made between a discipline and a subject matter. It is a distinction that might be familiar to students of early modern European religious history, especially in the great controversies of the seventeenth century. In the pamphlets associated with these controversies, such as John Milton’s *The Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce*, the pairing of doctrine and discipline tends to distinguish the beliefs to which members of a religion collectively subscribe (doctrine) from the regular practices that they collectively follow (discipline). The kinds of practices associated with the academic disciplines might be said to involve styles of thought, that is, procedures for identifying and gathering evidence, ways of posing and sequencing questions, conventions for distinguishing productive from unproductive questions, and practices for establishing sound demonstrations, building arguments, citing authorities, or making cases.

Yet if a discipline is not a subject matter, not a “content,” then neither, turning the question around, can we say that a discipline is reducible to a method. Method in general seems to be a lower-order category than discipline, though in many ways the categories traverse each other. Certainly a given discipline may be said to involve more than one method. We need only think of such different methods in sociology as functionalism and rational choice theory or, in literary criticism, formalism and contextualism. At certain moments, disciplines might even seem to be all but defined by a clash between competing methods—for example, the contestation between intrinsic and extrinsic approaches in literary studies or between internalist and externalist approaches in the history of science. True, methods may also cut across disciplinary lines, as when we speak of a psychoanalytic method as practiced in such diverse fields as history, art history, literary criticism, and psychology itself. But in spite of the partial overlap between the categories of discipline and method—one could perhaps make a similar argument for the relation of discipline to system or theory—it nonetheless makes sense to emphasize the ways in which discipline is a distinctive category, one that refuses to collapse into these others. It may be that one aspect of what distinguishes discipline from method goes back to the point that the former often has something like doctrine as its partner. That is, to go back to the seventeenth-century religious controversies, while it is true that doctrine and discipline are in principle separable, it is also true that discipline as regularized practice and doctrine as belief or opinion typically go hand in hand. They are acknowledged to have a relationship of mutual supplementarity; they have bearing on, and reference to, each other.

When we speak of method, by contrast, no such relationship to a body of belief, opinion, or content need be implied. One might even say that the stronger the emphasis on method as such, the further we are from doxa, from belief or opinion. Think again of Descartes’s severe articulation of this relationship in the *Discourse on Method*. Might we not reasonably say, at least within the grammar of the term in English, that while disciplines are not reducible to beliefs, opinions, and subject matters, they do typically seem to require the thickening or quickening of such content functions to count as disciplines? Perhaps this explains why, in some disciplinary systems, one is sometimes at a loss to explain how we distinguish between a discipline such as philology, on the one hand, and, on the other, its specific linguistic orientations and instantiations in, say, Germanic or Slavic studies. And what about the larger relationship between classical and modern philology? Do these amount to the same discipline, or two branches of a discipline, or are they separate disciplines altogether?

Unlike a discipline, a method seems to carry with it the sense of its own instrumentality. A method is a means to an end, a systematic way of proceeding toward a goal. We speak of a method as utilized or deployed. It will be taken up or discarded at will, depending on one’s sense of the needs or outcome of the project at hand. A discipline, by contrast, carries with it a sense of something more permanent and less procedural, something perhaps more definable in terms of professional attachment, a sense of belonging. One can claim to employ the historical method in literary criticism, as many literary scholars have done in recent years, but this is different from what is involved in acknowledging or professing that history is in fact one’s discipline. To be sure, such attachments can be multiple
and ambivalent in many cases. The late Barney Cohen, a longtime colleague at the University of Chicago, was once asked how he felt about his dual membership in the departments of anthropology and history. Cohen is supposed to have replied that it did not matter which discipline you identified with, just so long as you were properly ashamed of it. This comment probably dates to a particular historical moment, the period of post-Foucauldian embarrassment about the disciplines, which was also the period that first embraced Geertz's blurred academic genres. The point, however, is that one would not say such a thing about a method. One might be proud of a method, as some who have touted this or that new literary method in recent decades might well have seemed to us from time to time. (No need to name names.) But the plausible thought that one could be ashamed of one's discipline is an indication that disciplines operate on the level where our academic identities and attachments are at stake in a peculiarly important way.

Accordingly, then, we can say that for a set of intellectual practices to count as a discipline there must be some sort of institutional framework in which whatever regularity they impose can be mediated and effected. For a discipline to do its work it must have a home base and a sense of its identity over time; it must have a local habitation and a name. To say that disciplines are in this sense institutional is not to suggest, however, that they are entirely explicable by their institutional locations or even, as I shall be suggesting, that there is full agreement about how to think about disciplinary location in the first place. The dual point to be registered is subtle but crucial, and it can be summarized fairly straightforwardly. To imagine disciplines as entirely separable from their institutional arrangements is to produce an overly idealized sense of what they are and how they function. At the same time, to imagine that disciplines are nothing more than their institutional arrangements is to deny the possibility that a disciplinary system can evolve beyond the structure—that of the academic departments, for example—that is meant to administer it.

These issues about disciplines, already difficult, are further complicated by the fact that there are so many different ways of telling the history of disciplines and their emergence. There is the long story, for example, of the medieval university and the seven liberal arts—as depicted in an illustration from the 1506 Margarita philosophica that adorned publicity for “The Fate of Disciplines” conference. There is also a shorter narrative that begins in an enlightenment moment, when, as Robin Valenza argues in a forthcoming book, new disciplinary articulations rise alongside a new public culture and when a turn to specialized, disciplinary discourses necessarily coincides with the development of a Habermasian public sphere. And there is also the German idealist starting point, the theorization of the disciplines offered by Kant in The Conflict of the Faculties and their embodiment at the start of the nineteenth century in Wilhelm von Humboldt's widely emulated new-model university.

For purposes of understanding the American research university, we can look to a still later point of emergence. Most historians of the subject agree that the American research university in its modern form came into being in the period extending from about 1880 to 1910. This was the period of the founding of several major new American research universities on Humboldt's German model, including Johns Hopkins University, the University of Chicago, Stanford University, and Clark University. Roughly contemporary with the arrival of this group (Chicago, for example, opened in 1891) came other changes: the transformation of the Ivy League colleges from moral and religious centers of undergraduate education into something like their present shape, the relocation and make over of Columbia University and New York University, and the maturation of some of the most prestigious state universities, such as the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Michigan, and the University of Virginia. With such institutions leading the way and with a rapid expansion of demand both for higher education and research on the German model, a general configuration fairly quickly took shape, and it included a number of closely related features: (1) the organization of the arts and sciences faculties into an array of departments with now-familiar titles such as history, philosophy, biology, and economics; (2) the establishment of undergraduate programs of specialization, generally called majors; (3) the development of a set of graduate programs for research in the fields designated by the department titles and supporting the undergraduate education program in that same area; and (4) the emergence of the major professional associations, namely, the Modern Language Association (1883), the American Historical Association (1884), the American Economic Association (1885), the American Sociological Association (1902), and the American Anthropological Association (1902). These associations would support national professional journals and organize annual meetings that included

not only the presentation of papers but also the staging of the respective discipline's job market for hiring new faculty out of the rapidly developing graduate schools to teach undergraduates in the newly formed majors.

By all accounts, this American model had established itself quite successfully before the outbreak of the First World War, and it has persisted with remarkable tenacity to the present moment. But over the course of a century and across the board significant changes have taken place in the sorts of practices and problems that constituted disciplines' respective claims to specificity in the founding scheme. New problems and objects of inquiry have emerged. Such developments were acknowledged as early as the 1930s, and the University of Chicago, for example, began to form its interdisciplinary committees in the 1940s. But the decades since the 1960s have seen a particularly profound disturbance in the disciplinary system. These changes have been registered rather differently from one part of the university to the next. In the sciences, the changes resulting from technology-driven research in genetics and molecular biology have, in the instance of the University of Chicago, resulted in a complete makeover of the administrative structure of the biological sciences at least three times in the last couple of decades. The buildings erected long ago on our campus to house the disciplinary departments of zoology and botany no longer correspond to the work done by the scientists who work in them. In the humanities and the social sciences, changes have not been as radical, but they have certainly been perceptible. In these areas it has not been uncommon over the past couple of decades to find senior administrative officers charged with reviewing personnel cases observing that they might have difficulty knowing which tenure and appointment files came from which department were they not labeled accordingly.7

Some colleagues welcome these changes as the dawn of a new day, while others respond by elegizing a disciplinary arcadia where everything was in its proper place. Certainly in some of the traditional departments I know best, at Chicago and elsewhere, there is the sense of a departmental culture seriously transformed between the time when my generation attended graduate school in the early 1970s and the present moment. Where thirty years ago one's academic culture typically consisted in various forms of collegial exchange within the departments, increasingly one looks for collegial collaboration outside the department, and, to exaggerate the situation slightly, we sometimes seem to meet as a department only when there

are specific careers at stake, that is to say, when reviewing cases for hiring or promotion. As long as departments remain responsible for intellectual reproduction they will have the power to repopulate the institution, but this hardly means that the resulting population will settle into the departmental taxonomy.

There are perhaps two points in particular to emphasize in this changing state of affairs. The first is that this post-1960s period has seen an extraordinary development of new fields that might be called shadow disciplines. Most of these tend to go by the name of studies: cultural studies, gender studies, race studies, performance studies, film studies, media studies, ethnic studies, and science studies, among others. The occasion and genesis of these emerging fields varies considerably. Some address a new or newly important topic (gender, race, performance), some a new body of material (film, television, new media). Some offer a new approach to topics that link existing disciplines (cultural studies). Some are constituted by a high degree of reflexivity with respect to the existing shape of the disciplines (science studies). It is possible to see these new fields both as results of and as pressures on the changing organization of disciplinary practices in the humanities and the so-called soft social sciences. They result from changes within fields—the increasing interest in, say, cultural history within the domain of history, or “advanced society” within the domain of anthropology—but they in turn make demands on the whole system, generating new forms of teaching, new contexts for collegial collaboration, new agendas for research, and new student desire.

The second point is that, in spite of the resiliency of the university structure installed at the turn of the twentieth century, we have nonetheless seen a number of institutional innovations in the seams and interstices of the American university in recent decades. I mean not just the occasional institution-wide experiment, such as the University of California, Santa Cruz, or Hampshire College, but changes taking place throughout the national system and beyond. We have indeed seen new majors—gender studies, African American studies, cinema and media studies—and new organizations. We have seen innovative new journals and, here and there, even some new humanities departments. Perhaps more telling, we have seen a host of new forms of intramural association, new ways of housing and fostering research, that have grown up alongside the departments and graduate programs—a vast array of what we have come to call interdisciplinary initiatives under such headings as workshops, centers, collectives, working groups, and the like. Disciplinarity was itself a troubled term, not least, perhaps, by the shadow of Foucault's influential re-conception of discipline between The Order of Things (1966) and Discipline

7. The first administrator who made this observation to me was Gerhard Casper, then the provost at the University of Chicago, just before he left to become president of Stanford University in 1990.
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and Punish (1975). What was needed, in short, was the space of the interdisciplinary.

Perhaps the most telling innovation since the 1960s and one that reinforces the point about the much-increased focus on interdisciplinarity is the American-style humanities center. For the work of a humanities center, unlike its distant cousin the institute for advanced study, tends to be connected both with the new studies and with the more specific interdisciplinary initiatives associated with them. With just a couple of exceptions, before 1970 there was not a humanities center to be found on an American campus. The one at Wesleyan University celebrates its fiftieth anniversary this year, and it was indeed a genuine pioneer. Now there are scores and scores of them, and for over twenty years now they have had their own professional association, the Consortium for Humanities Centers and Institutes.

The distinction between a humanities center (or institute) and an institute of advanced study is by no means absolute, but it can be roughly formulated. An institute for advanced study mainly provides scholars with relief from teaching and administrative duties and a space in which to carry out their own work. A humanities center may include this function, but what makes it distinctive is that it opens a space to accommodate and coordinate forms of work—often work that reflects changes in research and pedagogy—in a way that is not easy or perhaps even possible within the existing departmental-disciplinary scheme.

Perhaps this tentative equilibrium, established by way of the interdisciplinary dispensation and the humanities institute form, is just how things should be, and it is in any case likely to be how things will stand for a while. Still, a number of vexing questions seem to haunt this rather unstable arrangement. What are we to do with all the new studies? How are we to assess their intellectual and institutional viability, stability, and sustainability? Is better integration of their various contributions desirable, possible, necessary? At what point do studies begin to count as disciplines? What are the criteria for this threshold crossing?

Some questions are yet more practically administrative: what does one do about the larger proliferation of a whole range of centers and institutes—human rights centers, international studies centers, regional centers, gender and race studies centers, and so on—of which the humanities center is just a particularly telling example? Richard Saller, former provost at Chicago, has said that the most emphatic piece of advice he was given by his predecessor, Geoffrey Stone, was to not add any new centers to the list of those two dozen or more already reporting directly to that office. This proliferation of units and therefore responsibilities bears directly on academics' daily lives. How many times can we change institutional hats in a day or a week as we circulate among our various new constituencies? Can the more traditional disciplines remain unaffected by all this?

Underlying many of these questions, perhaps, is one that addresses the picture of the disciplines that sometimes seems to be presupposed in the too-routinized discourse of the interdisciplinary that has underwritten the post-1960s situation. One might argue that the disciplinary paradigm hypostatizes disciplines as such in order to sustain the sense that all dynamism in academic intellectual life must necessarily occur in the spaces between. Is this a picture of disciplinarity we wish to accept? Finally, might it be the case that we have been insufficiently attentive to changing disciplinary relations, whether between disciplines or system-wide? One of the premises of "Questions of Evidence" was that issues within disciplines often masked issues between disciplines. The introduction to that volume argued, by way of example, that the new formalism in historiography of the 1970s and the New Historicism of literary studies in the 1980s were developments that should be understood in part as functions of a larger transformation in how those disciplines changed vis-à-vis each other. Is it possible that more attention to disciplinary change as a system-wide transformation, a change in disciplinary relations—think of a Bergsonian or Deleuzean movement-image here—might yield a more productive kind of institutional model than the one that insists on fixed disciplines and prolific interstices? Finally, if one were to change pictures in this way, how might we remodel our institutional and administrative structures accordingly? Do the biological sciences offer a model here? Do different national disciplinary systems have useful lessons to teach each other?

Even casual observers of debates about the state of the humanities and social sciences will be aware that in recent years some reaction has already been registered against the regime of post-1960s interdisciplinarity. Taking our bearings from Geertz's 1980 essay on blurred genres and from the subsequent boom in humanities centers in the 1980s, we can perhaps point to the mid-1990s as the beginning of a period of reaction to the unstable equilibrium sustained jointly under the regime of the humanities center and shibboleth of interdisciplinarity. One can discriminate at least three kinds of responses to this post-1960s interdisciplinary regime: one that is anti-interdisciplinary, one that is open to interdisciplinarity but worries that it wouldn't be possible without strong disciplines, and finally one that worries about the effect of all this on the question of academic authority and, ultimately, on academic freedom.

A good example of the first position is that of Andrew Abbott in his Chaos of Disciplines (2001). Abbott argues that the social structure of the
institutionalized disciplines is dual in character, lending it the strength of what he calls a “basket-weave.” On the one hand, there is the intra-institutional function of training students in particular fields of specialization. On the other, there is the interinstitutional function of supplying a regularized framework for hiring. The cultural structure of the disciplines offers dynamic possibilities that enable this mode of organization to modify gradually over time, and the sources of this dynamism are also twofold. First, there is what Abbott calls the “fractal logic” of the disciplines, the tendency within the system to repeat within units on lower levels of hierarchy the distinctions by virtue of which they themselves were created (CD, p. 233). Disciplines seek to be complete worlds unto themselves; they aspire to explain everything, albeit in their own way. Secondly, such aspirations therefore mean that the disciplines are necessarily involved in forms of competition that create changing cultural configurations over time. In short, the relative stability of the social structures between disciplines is complemented by the mutability of the cultural structures within them.

Abbott is thus inclined to downplay calls for interdisciplinarity, arguing that such calls have been a part of the American disciplinary system since the 1920s and 1930s. (The first OED entry is from 1937.) In his view, the system takes care of itself. It works “surprisingly well” (CD, p. 153). In any case, it had better work, since in his view it would be almost impossible to change it. The “overall structure” is, he says, “virtually unbreakable” (CD, p. 149). And he places the most importance on the sociology of the academic job market; this social structure is of such enormous force and resilience, argues Abbott, that “no university can challenge the disciplinary system as a whole without depriving its Ph.D. graduates of their academic future” (CD, p. 126).

Abbott’s analysis is not to be taken lightly. His reminders of the stubbornness of the system and of the long history of calls for interdisciplinarity are especially salutary. It is nonetheless possible to heed Abbott’s most important admonitions without accepting the full range of his conclusions. There are indeed, as I have suggested, legitimate questions about just how well the American disciplinary system has been working over these last decades and just how stable it is across a range of disciplines from the humanities to the biological sciences. Acknowledging biological sciences, at least, as a problem for his thesis, Abbott is nonetheless inclined to explain it as a function of increased funding in those fields. It is neither clear on the face of it that this explanation goes far enough nor that Abbott’s account works as well for the humanities as it does for the quantitative social sciences, where he has done his main work.

A good example of the second position would be that of Lynn Hunt, the feminist cultural historian of revolutionary France who produced much-admired interdisciplinary work in her books of the previous decades, especially Politics, Culture, and Class in the French Revolution (1984) and The Family Romance of the French Revolution (1992). Given her record, it may have appeared a moment of well-nigh Burkean apostasy when, in 1994, Hunt published an essay called “The Virtues of Disciplinarity” in a special issue of an interdisciplinary journal of cultural history. This characterization is not quite fair to her, any more than to Burke, however, since the article was at least partly an attempt to preserve the disciplines for the sake of interdisciplinarity. Interdisciplinarity, she declared, cannot live without disciplines: “its promise—of daring escape from confinement, heady transgression of expected conduct, and even the potential chastisement by those more orderly and predictable—depends on the certainty of disciplinary borders. You cannot cross boundaries if you don’t know where they are.” Interdisciplinarity will not “mean anything if the humanities dissolve into an undifferentiated pool of cultural studies.”

Marshall Sahlins, whose concerns about the fate of his own discipline, anthropology, are widely known, holds a similar position, though his expressed anxieties much more directly concern the fate of that discipline than that of any interdisciplinary activity it might be understood to anchor. One way to put the difference between the first position and the second is that whereas the first assumes that being interdisciplinary is either impossible, “very hard,” or simply redundant, the second position suggests that it is all too easy to slide into the interdisciplinary morass, to lose one’s bearings. Sahlins, in any case, gets to speak for himself in his witty and irreverent essay in this volume.

The third position, that which worries about the erosion of academic freedom, is the most recent to emerge. Louis Menand’s 1996 collection, The Future of Academic Freedom, part of a project commissioned by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, sounds a note of alarm about the
threat posed to the academy from within: "Administrators faced with allocating dwindling resources in the period of retrenchment that now seems upon the American university will be delighted to see the disciplines lose their authority, for it means spreading fewer faculty farther, and it gives them far greater control over the creation and elimination of staff positions." That volume includes an essay by Thomas Haskell, who recounts both the prehistory and the posthistory of the formation of the American Association of University Professors and its charter document, the 1915 "Declaration of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure." The point of Haskell's narrative is to show, first, that the principle of academic freedom as established in this report does not protect professors as individuals but only as members of the academic profession; second, that the freedom they have as members of the profession is there in order to protect their intellectual authority; and, finally, that their intellectual authority is preserved only by virtue of their participation in self-regulating "communities of the competent," that is, by virtue of their belonging to disciplines. Academic freedom protects the value of "the authority that inheres in a well-established disciplinary community" and makes little sense, as far as Haskell is concerned, in a world where disciplinary authority cannot be constituted and conceptualized as such. For Haskell, the Foucauldian analysis of "power/knowledge" imagines just such a world. Haskell's sense of Foucault is insufficiently sophisticated, in my view, and the account of the discipline function in Foucault's inaugural lecture for the Collège de France, L'Ordre du discours (1971), offers a much more complex picture of the question of disciplinary authority than Haskell suggests. David Wellbery weighs in on this important text of Foucault's in his contribution to this volume. It might nonetheless be conceded to Haskell that the bad name that disciplines acquired in the 1980s was shaped in part by a reading—Davidson would say a misreading—of Foucault's work in the 1970s.16

This volume picks up the story at just this point, with an essay by the self-described Foucauldian Robert Post. In a thoughtful meditation on a wide range of disciplines and on disciplinarity as such, Post worries that humanities scholars who forego claims to disciplinary expertise in favor of a more general notion of political critique or pedagogical charisma may be disqualifying themselves for necessary future defenses of their right to do what they do as academic intellectuals. This position is vigorously rejoined by Judith Butler on the grounds that universities do and must maintain norms not only within disciplines but also between them and that, whatever the university's claims to autonomy, it makes those claims as the university rather than as merely a home to various disciplines of recognized authority.

The topic we asked Post and Butler to address is the central definitional one: what is a discipline? But we also thought it was important to address some specifics of disciplinary practice and disciplinary change by way of some particular cases. The eight essays that comprise the body of this special issue do just that. There are four disciplinary cases in all, each addressed by two distinguished scholars in a relevant field. Since, for reasons I have explained above, we find it productive to think of disciplines not only singly but also relationally, we grouped these four case studies into two pairings that we initially intended to be suggestive of Raymond Williams's familiar distinction between emergent and residual formations. Theology and philology are two of the oldest disciplines in the European university; cinema studies and science studies are two of the most recent. Theology dominated curricular offerings before the advent of modern science (and well beyond); science studies has emerged only in recent decades to reflect on the work that scientists do and the conditions under which they do it. For centuries, philology reigned over the historical study of humane letters; cinema studies, by contrast, especially in its association with media studies, attempts to establish analogously programmatic approaches to its own differently embodied objects of study.

We know from Robert Burns, whose 250th birthday we celebrate this
year, that such carefully laid schemes a'gang a'gley. As things have played out in practice, the relations between residual and emergent, though never quite the inversion of what we imagined, have proven anything but settled. Cinema studies, so-called, might well be understood to be fighting a rear-guard action in an age of digital technologies, and both Dudley Andrew and Gertrud Koch address this question at some length. The converse is roughly true for theology, though we may have prejudiced the case by employing the rubric religious studies. Here we have a discipline with a long pedigree that is nonetheless now under some urgency to meet contemporary challenges, both practical and theoretical, taken up in the essays by Saba Mahmood, on the 2005–6 controversy over the anti-Muslim Danish cartoons, and by Amy Hollywood, on the place of St. Paul in contemporary critical theory.

As our distinguished contributors get into particulars, they at times dramatize fascinating rifts and tensions within the specific disciplinary cases as we have framed them. In the essays by Lorraine Daston and Mario Biagioli, for example, much depends on how we think of the broadly defined academic enterprise that reflects on the theory and practice of the natural sciences, that is, whether we understand this as science studies (the category as proposed for the panel and developed by Biagioli) or history of science (as Daston wryly suggests by way of allegorizing the star-crossed lovers in A Midsummer Night's Dream). On the other hand, the relation between the essays of François Hartog and Sheldon Pollock is more a matter of mutual suppleness than mutual contestation. Hartog's brief was to examine the place of classical philology in the West among its disciplinary rivals, such as anthropology, in the disciplinary debates that issued from Paris in the 1960s. Pollock's was to deliver his views on a subject he is understandably passionate about: what will become of the non-Western philological fields in the coming decades?

Given the constraints of space, the treatment of the issues in all these cases is intended to be provocative, exemplary, essayistic. And, of course, the choice of the cases themselves was selective in the extreme. It would have taken many special issues to deal with all the disciplines and shadow disciplines or with all the imaginable pairings.

The essays by David Wellbery and Marshall Sahlins broaden the focus to address "The System of Disciplines," reflecting our twofold concern that to address the fate of disciplines requires more than investigations of them one by one or even two by two and that to consider the changing array of disciplines system-wide is a daunting challenge to which not many schol-
Paris-Diderot. This project, planned and executed with François Jullien, was called *L’Ordre des disciplines: Objets, méthodes, problèmes*, and its aim was to generate comparative discussion between scholars from the French and American systems about how best to understand disciplinary innovation in each context. The proceedings for this conference were published in *Cahiers parisiens*, the journal of the University of Chicago’s Paris Center, where the conference was held. Our hope is that it might become a model for other such international meetings.

On another front, we have been taking some practical steps at the University of Chicago, with much help from our friends, toward establishing laboratories for producing new and better thinking about some of the problems broached in this volume and perhaps for helping universities to evolve toward more effective institutional arrangements in support of ongoing research in the humanities and related disciplines. At the Franke Institute, we have created a new center for graduate-level seminars conducted by faculty teams representing two different departments. We call this enterprise the Center for Disciplinary Innovation (CDI) to emphasize that the point is not to pursue the path marked “interdisciplinarity” but rather to keep disciplinary questions continually in focus. Thus, when two faculty propose a course for the CDI, they have to present a rationale for the course framed not only with respect to its substantive issues but also with respect to its disciplinary contexts; for instance, why the course cannot be offered in the usual curricular structures and how such a course, or another like it, might advance the transformation of the disciplines. Like the research fellows program at the Franke, moreover, faculty teaching in the CDI constitutes a fellowship. Participating faculty pool resources and share their experiences teaching in this experimental program.

In these ways, in addition to generating some attractively collaborative graduate teaching, and creating vital new teaching experiences, the CDI will be developing an ongoing conversation about the direction of the disciplines and the success of existing institutional arrangements in supporting them. All this, we think, can only help us to make better judgments about the intellectual organization of the university of the future. What is most promising, however, is that humanities centers at three universities—Berkeley, Columbia, and Cambridge—have each created such centers of their own and have joined forces with us to form the Consortium for Disciplinary Innovation. The consortium is in its second year and is thriving. It offers the hope that collective action on these large problems may yet be possible.

20. See hum.uchicago.edu/frankenstitute/cdi.html